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OPINION OF THE COURT
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FISHER, Circuit Judge.
S.R.P., a minor, appeals from an order of the District
Court dismissing his claims for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).
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The action arose out of a 2004 incident in which S.R.P. was
bitten by a barracuda while playing near the shore of Buck
Island Reef National Monument (“Buck Island Monument” or
“the Monument”). S.R.P., through his mother, filed suit
against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act
(“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq., alleging that the
Government negligently failed to warn of the danger posed by
barracudas to shallow water bathers. The District Court
dismissed the case on the basis that the discretionary function
exception to the FTCA deprived it of jurisdiction, and thus
immunized the Government from suit. For the reasons set
forth below, we will affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
On May 9, 2004, while sitting on the beach at Buck
Island (“Buck Island” or “the Island”) with his feet in shallow
water, then 12-year-old S.R.P. was bitten by a barracuda and
suffered a severe laceration to his foot. His third and fourth
toes were nearly severed and surgery was required to repair
the damage. Buck Island is located 1.25 miles off the
northeast side of the island of St. Croix in the U.S. Virgin
Islands. It is a unit of the National Park System under the
control and management of the National Park Service (“the
NPS”). Prior to 2001, Buck Island Monument included Buck
Island itself and 704 marine acres surrounding the island. In
2001, President Clinton issued an executive proclamation
expanding the boundaries of the Monument, designating the
surrounding 18,869 marine acres as a protected area, and
directing the Secretary of the Interior to “prohibit all
extractive uses.” Proclamation No. 7392, 66 Fed. Reg. 7336
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(Jan. 17, 2001). Pursuant to this directive, in 2003, Buck
Island and its surrounding waters were closed to fishing.
Buck Island is accessible only by watercraft, and is
open to the public for recreational activities, such as
swimming, picnicking, hiking, snorkeling, and scuba diving.
Approximately 55,000 to 60,000 people visit each year. Most
tourists travel to the Island via private concessionaries, which
offer half-day or full-day trips. Visitors may also access
Buck Island by private boat, but any owner of a vessel who
wishes to visit must apply for an anchoring permit. At the
time of application, boat owners receive a packet of
information, including the Buck Island Reef Brochure (“the
Buck Island brochure”), which provides general information
about Buck Island, including natural hazards in the area. A
portion of the brochure labeled “Safety Tips for Sea and
Shore” states:
Reef and marine hazards: Shallows and reefs
near shore contain sharp corals, stingrays, spiny
sea urchins, fire coral, fire worms, and barbed
snails. Cuts from marine organisms infect
quickly, so clean and medicate them.
Portuguese man-o-war and sea wasps, both
stinging jellyfish, are rarely found here.
Barracuda and sharks, if encountered, should be
treated with caution but are not usually
aggressive toward snorkelers.
The same information is posted, in both English and Spanish,
on signs located at the picnic areas on the Island.
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Barracuda is a species of fish indigenous to the
Caribbean Sea and the waters around Buck Island. Although
barracudas are not generally aggressive toward humans, it is
believed that they may attack humans if they mistake a limb
or other body appendage for prey. Prior to the attack at issue
in this case, NPS officials were aware of only one other
incident in the previous twenty-two years in which a
barracuda had bitten a human at or around Buck Island. In
that attack, which occurred sometime before 1999, a boat
captain was bitten while sitting on the side of his boat with
his feet dangling in the water. The NPS attributed the attack
to the boat captain’s pouring fish oil in the water around his
feet. At the time he was bitten, there were several snorkelers
in the water nearby, none of whom were attacked.
On June 16, 2006, S.R.P., through his mother, brought
a tort action against the United States under the FTCA,
alleging that the NPS failed to adequately warn visitors about
the dangers posed by barracudas, and that the NPS failed to
properly staff Buck Island. 1 On October 27, 2009, the
Government moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1) on the basis that the FTCA’s discretionary function
exception applied.
After allowing discovery on the
jurisdictional question, the District Court of the Virgin Islands
granted the motion to dismiss on October 1, 2010, concluding
that the discretionary function exception barred S.R.P.’s
claims because NPS policies gave local NPS officials
1

S.R.P. does not appeal the District Court’s dismissal
of his negligent staffing claim.
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discretion to craft appropriate warnings regarding potential
safety hazards, and the question of whether and to what extent
to warn involved significant policy considerations. Perez v.
United States, No. 06-0080, 2010 WL 3927628 (D.V.I.
Oct. 1, 2010).
S.R.P. filed a timely notice of appeal. His primary
contention on appeal is that the District Court erred in
concluding that the discretionary function exception barred
his claims because the NPS was aware that barracudas posed
a danger to swimmers, and thus had a non-discretionary duty
to warn. He also argues that the District Court failed to apply
the relaxed standard required for factual challenges to subject
matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), and that the District
Court improperly shifted to him the burden of proving the
non-applicability of the discretionary function exception.
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
S.R.P.’s complaint invoked the District Court’s
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(3),
1367(a), and the FTCA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2674 and 1346(b). We
have appellate jurisdiction over an appeal from a dismissal for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Because the Government’s motion presented a factual
challenge to subject matter jurisdiction, the District Court was
not confined to the allegations in S.R.P.’s complaint, and was
entitled to independently evaluate the evidence to resolve
disputes over jurisdictional facts. Turicentro, S.A. v. Am.
Airlines, Inc., 303 F.3d 293, 300 n.4 (3d Cir. 2002) (overruled
on other grounds by Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China
Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462 (3d Cir. 2011)); Mortensen v.
6

First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir.
1977). We exercise plenary review over the applicability of
the discretionary function exception. Merando v. United
States, 517 F.3d 160, 163-64 (3d Cir. 2008). We review the
District Court’s findings of fact related to jurisdiction for
clear error. CNA v. United States, 535 F.3d 132, 139 (3d Cir.
2008). We exercise plenary review in determining whether
the District Court applied the correct standard in evaluating a
motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1) and whether it placed the burden of proof on the
proper party. See id.
III. Discussion
A.

The Federal Tort Claims Act Framework

The United States, “as a sovereign, is immune from
suit unless it consents to be sued.” Merando, 517 F.3d at 164
(citing United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980)).
The FTCA is a “partial abrogation” of that immunity, Gotha
v. United States, 115 F.3d 176, 179 (3d Cir. 1997), and
permits suits against the United States for torts committed by
“any employee of the Government while acting within the
scope of his office or employment, under circumstances
where the United States, if a private person, would be liable
to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where
the act or omission occurred,” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). The
FTCA, however, “imposes a significant limitation,” Gotha,
115 F.3d at 179, by providing that the provisions of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346 shall not apply to:
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[a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an
employee of the Government, exercising due
care, in the execution of a statute or regulation,
whether or not such statute or regulation be
valid, or based upon the exercise or
performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function or duty on the
part of a federal agency or an employee of the
Government, whether or not the discretion
involved be abused.
28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
This discretionary function exception “marks the
boundary between Congress’ willingness to impose tort
liability upon the United States and its desire to protect
certain governmental activities from exposure to suit by
private individuals.” United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao
Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 808
(1984). The exception “does not apply to every situation in
which there is an actual option to choose between courses of
action or inaction.” Gotha, 115 F.3d at 179. Rather, it
immunizes from second-guessing “legislative and
administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and
political policy.” Id. (citing Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 814).
As a threshold matter, before determining whether the
discretionary function exception applies, a court must identify
the conduct at issue. Merando, 517 F.3d at 165. The court
must then follow a two-step inquiry to determine whether the
discretionary function exception immunizes the government
from a suit arising out of such conduct. Id. at 164. “First, a
8

court must determine whether the act giving rise to the
alleged injury and thus the suit involve[d] an ‘element of
judgment or choice.’” Id. (citing United States v. Gaubert,
499 U.S. 315, 322 (1991)). If a “federal statute, regulation, or
policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an
employee to follow,” the exception does not apply because
“the employee has no rightful option but to adhere to the
directive.” Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536
(1988). However, where a specific course of action is not
prescribed, we proceed to the second step, which requires us
to determine “whether the challenged action or inaction ‘is of
the kind that the discretionary function exception was
designed to shield.’” Gotha, 115 F.3d at 179 (quoting
Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536). “Because the purpose of the
exception is to prevent judicial ‘second-guessing’ of
legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social,
economic, and political policy . . . the exception protects only
governmental actions and decisions based on considerations
of public policy.” Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 323 (internal marks
and citations omitted). The “focus of the inquiry is not on the
agent’s subjective intent in exercising the discretion conferred
by statute or regulation, but on the nature of the actions taken
and on whether they are susceptible to policy analysis.” Id. at
325.
Although a plaintiff bears the burden of establishing
that his claims fall within the scope of the FTCA’s waiver of
the federal government’s sovereign immunity (i.e., that the
requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) are met), the
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Government has the burden of proving the applicability of the
discretionary function exception. 2 Merando, 517 F.3d at 164.

2

We recognize that at least one of our sister circuits
holds that where the Government raises the discretionary
function exception, the plaintiff bears the burden to prove that
the exception does not apply. See Aragon v. United States,
146 F.3d 819, 823 (10th Cir. 1998). Several other courts of
appeals have declined to decide the issue. See St. Tammany
Parish v. FEMA, 556 F.3d 307, 315 n.3 (5th Cir. 2009)
(collecting cases). We acknowledge that the Supreme Court’s
statement in United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 324-25
(1991), that “[f]or a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss,
it must allege facts which would support a finding that the
challenged actions are not the kind of conduct that can be said
to be grounded in the policy of the regulatory regime” creates
some uncertainty as to where the Court intended to place the
burden.
10

B.
The Applicability
Function Exception

of

the

Discretionary

We turn now to S.R.P.’s contention that the District
Court erred in concluding that the challenged conduct is
protected by the discretionary function exception.
1.
Before engaging in the two-part discretionary function
analysis, we must identify the challenged conduct. Merando,
517 F.3d at 165. S.R.P.’s complaint states:
However, absent an explicit statement from the
Supreme Court that the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden, we
continue to believe that the burden of proving the
applicability of the discretionary function exception is most
appropriately placed on the Government. Although the
discretionary function exception is jurisdictional on its face, it
is analogous to an affirmative defense. Therefore, just as a
plaintiff cannot be expected to disprove every affirmative
defense that a defendant could potentially raise, so too should
a plaintiff not be expected to disprove every exception to the
FTCA. Moreover, the Government will generally be in the
best position to prove facts relevant to the applicability of the
discretionary function exception. Our view is in accord with
that of the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Sixth, Seventh, and
Ninth Circuits. See Prescott v. United States, 973 F.2d 696,
702 (9th Cir. 1992); Carlyle v. United States, 674 F.2d 554,
556 (6th Cir. 1982); Stewart v. United States, 199 F.2d 517,
520 (7th Cir. 1952).
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Defendant NPS created and or maintained a
dangerous condition on Buck Island in that
there were no signs on the premises of Buck
Island warning visitors of the existence of
barracudas and/or large predatory fish on or
near the premises of Buck Island. . . . At all
times relevant herein, Defendant NPS knew or
should have known of the dangerous conditions
it created on Buck Island.
Despite the broad language of his complaint, S.R.P. does not
allege that the NPS provided no warnings at all regarding the
presence of barracudas in the waters surrounding Buck Island.
He acknowledges that the Buck Island Reef Brochure states
that “[b]arracuda and sharks, if encountered, should be treated
with caution but are not usually aggressive toward
snorkelers.” Instead, he claims that such warnings, by their
terms, apply only to snorkelers, and are therefore inadequate
to advise shallow water bathers of the risk of a barracuda
attack. Thus, he alleges that the NPS was negligent in failing
to adequately warn visitors about the possibility of a shoreline
barracuda attack.
A key dispute in this case is the extent of the NPS’s
knowledge regarding the dangers posed by barracudas.
S.R.P. argues that the NPS was aware that barracudas might
attack shoreline swimmers. The Government, however,
maintains that although NPS officials were aware in the most
general sense that barracudas could be dangerous to humans,
they had no information to suggest that barracudas posed a
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risk to shoreline swimmers specifically. 3 Accordingly, the
conduct at issue is the NPS’s judgment regarding whether to
provide warnings and the extent of any such warnings, in
light of the information available.
2.
We must first determine whether a statute, regulation,
or other policy required the NPS to warn of hazardous
conditions in a specific manner, or whether the NPS’s actions
were discretionary because they involved an “element of
judgment or choice.” Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322. After
reviewing the applicable policies, we are convinced that NPS
officials are explicitly vested with broad discretion regarding
the manner in which to warn the public of dangerous
conditions in national parks.
Under the NPS Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1, the NPS is
charged with
promot[ing] and regulat[ing] the use of . . .
national parks . . . by such means and measures
as conform to the fundamental purpose of the
said parks, . . . which purpose is to conserve the
scenery and the natural and historic objects and
3

We review the District Court’s findings of fact
related to jurisdiction for clear error. CNA v. United States,
535 F.3d 132, 139 (3d Cir. 2008). The District Court agreed
with the Government’s position and as we will explain later,
the District Court’s finding was not clearly erroneous.
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the wild life therein and to provide for the
enjoyment of the same in such manner and by
such means as will leave them unimpaired for
the enjoyment of future generations.
To implement this statutory directive, the NPS has adopted
various policies and internal operating procedures, including
those related to public safety and signage. The 2001 NPS
Management Policies (“Management Policies” or “the
Policies”) provides:
While recognizing that there are limitations on
its capability to totally eliminate all hazards, the
Service . . . will seek to provide a safe and
healthful environment for visitors and
employees. . . . The Service will strive to
identify recognizable threats to the safety and
health of persons and to the protection of
property. . . . When practicable, and consistent
with congressionally designated purposes and
mandates, the Service will reduce or remove
known hazards and apply other appropriate
measures, including closures, guarding, signing,
or other forms of education. In doing so, the
Service’s preferred actions will be those that
have the least impact on park resources and
values.
National Park Service, 2001 Management Policies, at
¶ 8.2.5.1 (2001) (emphasis added).
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The Management Policies thus clearly envision a
system in which NPS officials will attempt to strike a balance
between preservation of a park’s scenery and natural
resources and public safety. However, the Policies do not
specifically dictate the way in which park officials should
balance these concerns or the specific actions that must be
taken in response to particular problems. In fact, the Policies
provides:
These management policies do not impose parkspecific visitor safety prescriptions. The means
by which public safety concerns are to be
addressed is left to the discretion of
superintendents and other decision-makers at
the park level, who must work within the limits
of funding and staffing. Examples include
decisions about whether to install warning signs
or artificial lighting; distribute weather
warnings or advisories; . . . eliminate potentially
dangerous animals; close roads and trails; or
install guardrails and fences[.]
Id. (emphasis added).
These policy statements clearly vest local NPS
officials with broad discretion to develop appropriate
responses to natural hazards, including the posting of signs,
based on a weighing of the applicable policy interests.
The NPS Sign Manual provides: “the individual park
manager . . . has the responsibility for determining whether or
not a sign is necessary or appropriate at a given location. The
15

decision to utilize a particular sign at a particular location
requires the professional judgment of the park manager[.]”
National Park Service Sign Manual, at ¶ 1-1 (Jan. 1988). In
making such decisions, park officials are to “bear in mind
long standing NPS policy to minimally intrude upon the
natural or historic setting in National Park System areas, and
to avoid an unnecessary proliferation of signs, while striving
to ensure for the safety of park visitors.” Id. The
Management Policies further provides that “[s]igns will be
held to the minimum number, size, and wording required to
serve their intended functions.” Management Policies, at
¶ 9.3.1.1. As these policies make evident, local NPS officials
are afforded discretion both as to whether to post warning
signs and as to the content of such signs. Accordingly, we
hold that no statute, regulation, or policy mandated any
particular method for warning about marine hazards at Buck
Island. 4 The NPS’s “decisions as to the precise manner in
which to do so, and its execution of those decisions,”
Merando, 517 F.3d at 168, were discretionary because they
involved an “element of judgment or choice,” see Gaubert,
499 U.S. at 322.
Our conclusion is in accord with those of other courts
that have addressed the issue. As the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit explained in Blackburn v. United States,
“the [NPS] policy manuals’ broad mandate to warn the public
of and protect it from special hazards involves the exercise of
discretion in identifying such hazards, in determining which
4

S.R.P. has not identified any Buck Island-specific
policies or regulations that would dictate a different result.
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hazards require an explicit warning and in determining the
precise manner in which to warn it of those hazards.” 100
F.3d 1426, 1431 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). “Because
the NPS cannot apprise the public of every potential danger
posed by every feature of [a national park], a degree of
judgment is required in order to determine which hazards
require an explicit warning and which hazards speak for
themselves.” Valdez v. United States, 56 F.3d 1177, 1180
(9th Cir. 1995); see also Terbush v. United States, 516 F.3d
1125, 1128, 1140 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that the decision
not to post warning signs regarding a recent rockfall at
Yosemite National Park was discretionary); Elder v. United
States, 312 F.3d 1172, 1176-80 (10th Cir. 2002) (concluding
that the decision whether to post additional signs warning of
the danger of algae in streams at Zion National Park was
discretionary); Shanksy v. United States, 164 F.3d 688, 690,
692 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that the NPS’s decision as to
whether to post warning signs at the exit of a historical
building was discretionary).
3.
Having concluded that no statute, regulation, or policy
mandates specific action by NPS officials with respect to
warning signs on Buck Island, we must now determine
whether the discretionary judgment afforded to NPS is “of the
kind that the discretionary function exception was designed to
shield.” Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536. Only those decisions
“susceptible to policy analysis” are protected by the
exception. Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 325. We begin by noting
that “[w]hen established governmental policy, as expressed or
implied by statute, regulation, or agency guidelines, allows a
17

Government agent to exercise discretion, it must be presumed
that the agent’s acts are grounded in policy when exercising
that discretion.” Id. at 324. That presumption, however, can
be rebutted. Cestonaro v. United States, 211 F.3d 749, 755
n.4 (3d Cir. 2000). In fact, we have made clear that
“susceptibility analysis is not a toothless standard that the
[G]overnment can satisfy merely by associating a decision
with a regulatory concern.” Id. at 755 (internal marks and
citation omitted). Rather, the Government must establish that
the challenged conduct is “grounded in the policy of the
regulatory regime,” and “based on the purposes that the . . .
regime seeks to accomplish,” Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 325 & n.7.
In other words, there must be a “rational nexus” between the
Government’s decision and “social, economic, and political
concerns.” Cestonaro, 211 F.3d at 759.
We conclude that the NPS’s decision not to post
additional warning signs or add language to existing warning
signs regarding the danger of a shoreline barracuda attack is
susceptible to policy analysis because in determining the
number, size, and content of warning signs, the NPS had to
weigh the potential benefits of additional warnings against the
costs of such warnings, including the risk of numbing Buck
Island visitors to all warnings. Such a determination is
directly related to the NPS’s mission of preserving national
parks while ensuring public safety and is thus firmly
“grounded in the policy of the regulatory regime.” See
Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 325.
Buck Island is an offshore island in a “wild open ocean
circumstance,” in which virtually unlimited natural hazards
are present, and the NPS must make a policy determination as
18

to which dangers are significant enough to merit specific
attention on a warning sign. We have previously held that
assessments of the respective degrees of risk presented by
natural hazards and decisions regarding appropriate responses
to such risks are susceptible to policy analysis. For example,
in Merando v. United States, the plaintiffs challenged the
manner in which the NPS located and removed hazardous
trees. 517 F.3d at 162. In finding the discretionary function
exception applicable, we stated that “knowing that it could
not inspect every tree in the Park, the Park Service decided to
expend the bulk of its resources on high-visitor use areas.”
Id. at 174. Likewise, in Mitchell v. United States, 225 F.3d
361, 363, 366 (3d Cir. 2000), we held that the NPS’s choice
not to repair or improve a drainage ditch and concrete headwall located near a paved roadway was susceptible to policy
analysis because the NPS “was forced to determine priorities
among the desirable improvements” and “repair the most
urgent problems first.” We explained that, compared to other
problems with the roadway, the defect complained of by the
plaintiff presented only a “low risk of accident.” Id. at 366.
Similarly, here, knowing that it could not warn of
every potential hazard at Buck Island, the NPS decided to
focus on those it reasonably believed posed the most
significant threat to visitors. Moreover, too many warning
signs and brochures “would inevitably reduce the impact of
the individual warnings on the public,” Valdez, 56 F.3d at
1180, as would excessive warnings on any individual sign.
Once an agency identifies a hazard, it “must then balance that
risk against the cost of warning about that hazard and the
possibility of overloading visitors with unnecessary
19

warnings.” Perez, 2010 WL 3927628, at *12 (citations
omitted). Such a judgment represents precisely the type of
policy choice that the discretionary function exception
prohibits us from second-guessing. Accordingly, we reject
S.R.P.’s contention that once the Government decides to
warn, it is no longer protected by the discretionary function
exception. The exception protects both the decision whether
to warn and decisions regarding the scope and content of such
warnings. We agree with the District Court that “Congress
[did not] create[] the discretionary function exception only to
force the NPS into the Catch-22 of choosing between issuing
no warnings at all and posting warnings about every
conceivable danger, no matter how remote or hypothetical.”
Id. at *14; see Shanksy, 164 F.3d at 694 (rejecting the
plaintiff’s argument that once the Government “decided to
effectuate some modern safety measures, it became obliged to
take all feasible safety measures”). Even if S.R.P. is
advocating only for the incorporation of additional language
regarding barracudas into existing warning signs, “such a
change would necessitate a chain of further decisions,” Elder,
312 F.3d at 1183, including whether to explain how to
identify barracudas, and whether to offer detailed advice
about what someone should do if he or she encounters a
barracuda. Indeed, in his brief, S.R.P. argues that the Buck
Island brochure should have explained in greater detail what
it means to treat barracudas with “caution.” 5

5

At her deposition, Zandy Hillis-Starr, the local NPS
official responsible for overseeing marine research in St.
Croix, testified that she understood the warning to mean “to
20

The Government draws our attention to the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Elder v. United
States, 312 F.3d 1172 (10th Cir. 2002), which is instructive
because it presents a factual scenario strikingly similar to that
in our case. The suit in Elder arose out of a 1997 incident, in
which a twelve-year-old boy died while attempting to cross a
stream at the Middle Emerald Pools in Zion National Park.
Id. at 1174. As he stepped into the stream, the boy slipped on
slick algae, slid downstream, fell over a ledge, and plunged
more than 100 feet onto the rocks below. Id. Along the trail
to the Middle Emerald Pools, there were numerous signs
warning visitors of various hazards and cautioning visitors to
stay on the trail. Id. at 1174-75. No signs specifically
mentioned the danger of algae in the streams. Id. at 1175.
Nor were there any barriers preventing visitors from leaving
the trail and walking into the stream. Id. After the accident,
the plaintiffs brought suit against the United States under the
FTCA, alleging that the NPS was negligent for failing to
specifically warn of the algae hazard and for failing to
provide adequate barriers to prevent visitors from falling over
the ledge. Id. at 1176. In response to the Government’s
not approach [a wild animal], to not threaten it, to not be
aggressive toward it . . . [t]o observe it quietly, and to move
away if you feel at all threatened.” S.R.P. apparently wants
this common sense definition included in the Buck Island
brochure. Although the adequacy of the language in the
brochure relates more directly to S.R.P.’s underlying
negligence claim, we note that a warning brochure cannot be
expected to include a definition of every term therein.
21

motion to dismiss based on the discretionary function
exception, the plaintiffs argued that decisions regarding
barriers and signs at the Middle Emerald Pools involved no
policy considerations because park officials’ sole
consideration should have been park safety. Id. at 1181. The
Tenth Circuit disagreed, reasoning that “park officials must
weigh the cost of safety measures against the additional safety
that will be achieved. Even inexpensive signs may not be
worth their cost.” Id. Additionally, “in a national park whose
purpose is to preserve nature and display beauty to the public,
any safety measure must be weighed against damage to
natural resources and aesthetic values.” Id.
We acknowledge that if the discretionary function
exception is given an overly broad construction, it could
easily swallow the FTCA’s general waiver of sovereign
immunity and frustrate the purpose of the statute.
Accordingly, we have held that where the Government is
aware of a specific risk and responding to that risk would
only require the Government to take garden-variety remedial
steps, the discretionary function exception does not apply.
Finding that such cases are outside the scope of the
discretionary function exception is consistent with the
primary purpose of the FTCA. Cestonaro, 211 F.3d at 755.
As the Supreme Court has explained, “[u]ppermost in the
collective mind of Congress [when it passed the FTCA] were
the ordinary common-law torts.” Dalehite v. United States,
346 U.S. 15, 28 (1953) (partially overruled on other grounds
by Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315 (1957)).
“[C]ongressional thought was centered on granting relief for
the run-of-the-[mill] accidents,” id. at 28 n.19, which
22

occurred due to the Government’s failure to take basic steps
to alleviate specific safety concerns. In such a situation, the
Government’s conduct is analogous to that of a private citizen
who fails to take appropriate action to ensure the safety of
visitors on his or her property, and thus no broad public
policy concerns are implicated.
In arguing that the NPS’s decision regarding warning
signage at Buck Island was analogous to an “ordinary
common law-tort[],” id. at 28, and thus not susceptible to
policy analysis, S.R.P. relies on our decisions in Gotha v.
United States, 115 F.3d 176 (3d Cir. 1997), and Cestonaro v.
United States, 211 F.3d 749 (3d Cir. 2000). Because the key
distinctions between those cases and our case are factual, we
will review them in some detail. In Gotha, we addressed
whether the United States Navy’s failure to install a handrail
or lighting on a steep pathway at a Navy facility in the Virgin
Islands was protected by the discretionary function exception.
115 F.3d at 178. In that case, the plaintiff fell and injured her
ankle while walking on an unlit, unpaved path approximately
fifteen to twenty feet in length, which dropped downward at a
steep angle. Id. She brought suit against the Government
under the FTCA, alleging that the Navy was negligent for
failing to provide a stairway with handrails and for neglecting
to provide sufficient lighting on the pathway.
Id.
Significantly, there was evidence that the Navy was aware of
the risk because it had been asked on several previous
occasions to build a stairway or install handrails. Id. at 180.
The Government moved to dismiss under the discretionary
function exception, claiming that the Navy’s actions were
motivated by “military, social, and economic considerations.”
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Id. at 181. The Government claimed that the Navy’s decision
was informed by the need to train in a “realistic warfare
environment,” as well as economic factors, such as budgetary
constraints, procurement regulations, and the anticipated
service life of the facility. Id. In rejecting the Government’s
argument and holding that the challenged conduct fell outside
the scope of the discretionary function exception, we
observed that the case was “not about a national security
concern, but rather a mundane, administrative, gardenvariety, housekeeping problem that [was] about as far
removed from the policies applicable to the Navy’s mission
as . . . possible.” Id. We opined that “it [was] difficult to
conceive of a case more likely to have been within the
contemplation of Congress when it abrogated sovereign
immunity than the case before us.” Id. at 182. Accordingly,
we concluded that “the challenged actions [were] not the kind
of conduct that [could] be said to be grounded in the policy of
the regulatory regime.” Id. at 181-82 (quoting Gaubert, 499
U.S. at 325).
In Cestonaro, while vacationing with his family,
Daniele Cestonaro was shot and killed in a parking lot in
Christiansted on the island of St. Croix. 211 F.3d at 751. The
parking lot fell within the boundaries of the Christiansted
National Historic Site, which was owned and controlled by
the National Park Service. Id. The plaintiff (Cestonaro’s
wife) brought suit under the FTCA, alleging that the NPS was
negligent for failing to provide adequate lighting and warning
signs in the lot. Id. at 752. The district court dismissed the
action based on the discretionary function exception, finding
that the NPS’s challenged decisions were grounded in its
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mission to “safeguard the natural and historic integrity of
national parks” while “minimally intrud[ing] upon the setting
of such parks.” Id. at 752 (citation omitted). We reversed,
reasoning that the NPS’s decision was not related to any of
the overarching policies cited by the district court. Id. at 756.
Rather, the case involved a tort stemming from a garden
variety decision not to implement safety measures, even
though the NPS was aware that crimes had occurred in the
lot, and had received regular complaints from local business
owners about the safety of the lot. Id. at 751, 755. We stated
that a suit based on such actions was precisely the type of
case Congress contemplated when it abrogated sovereign
immunity by passing the FTCA, id. at 755-56, and thus, we
held that the Government could not “seek shelter under the
discretionary function exception,” id. at 759.
Decisions from other courts support our view that
where the Government is aware of a specific risk of harm,
and eliminating the danger would not implicate policy but
would involve only garden-variety remedial measures, the
discretionary function exception does not apply.
For
example, in Boyd v. United States, 881 F.2d 895, 896, 898
(10th Cir. 1989), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit held that the discretionary function exception did not
apply where the Army Corps of Engineers created a reservoir,
but failed to warn swimmers who regularly used a section of
the lake that motorboats also used the area. The court
reasoned that the alleged failure to warn swimmers of a
dangerous condition in a popular swimming area did not
implicate any social, economic, or political policy judgments.
Id. at 898. Similarly, in Oberson v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 514
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F.3d 989, 998 (9th Cir. 2008), the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit held that where the Forest Service was
aware that two snowmobiles had recently collided on a steep
portion of a snowmobile track, the Forest Service’s failure to
post a warning or otherwise remedy the hazard was not
protected by the discretionary function exception. Likewise,
in George v. United States, 735 F. Supp. 1524, 1528, 1533
(M.D. Ala. 1990), the U.S. District Court for the Middle
District of Alabama concluded that where at least six
incidents of “aggressive alligator behavior” in a swimming
area had been reported to various park officials, the Forest
Service was on specific notice of the danger and its failure to
take remedial measures was not within the ambit of the
discretionary function exception.
See also Fabend v.
Rosewood Hotels & Resorts, L.L.C., 174 F. Supp. 2d 356,
360, n.10 (D.V.I. 2001) (noting that the hazard in that case
was “well-defined and specific, not a nebulous or hidden
danger” and stating that “[w]here the danger is specific rather
than merely potential, the discretionary function exception
may not protect a government agency’s failure to warn”)
(citations omitted).
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In our case, unlike Gotha, Cestonaro, and the other
cases cited above, the NPS was not aware of a specific risk. 6
Thus, S.R.P.’s reliance on those cases is misplaced. The
District Court found that although the NPS was aware in a
general sense that barracudas were potentially dangerous,
there was no evidence that NPS officials were or should have
been specifically aware of the risk of a shallow-water attack.
We review this finding for clear error. CNA, 535 F.3d at 139.
Under the clearly erroneous standard, we may not substitute
our findings for those of the trial court. Scully v. US WATS,
Inc., 238 F.3d 497, 506 (3d Cir. 2001). Rather, we are limited
to assessing whether there is enough evidence on the record
to support those findings. Id. “That a different set of
inferences could be drawn from the record is not
determinative. It is sufficient that the District Court findings
of fact could be reasonably inferred from the entire [] record.”
Id. (citations omitted).
The District Court explained that although NPS
officials recognized that shoreline swimmers might encounter
a barracuda, there was no evidence that the presence of
barracudas near the shore was a danger to the public. The
District Court noted that “out of hundreds of thousands of
6

Although NPS decisions regarding whether and to
what extent to warn the public of the dangers posed by
wildlife will generally be susceptible to policy analysis, it is
possible that the NPS could be aware of a safety hazard so
blatant that its failure to warn the public could not reasonably
be said to involve policy considerations. Therefore, we will
review the extent of the NPS’s knowledge in this case.
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Buck Island visitors over the last several decades, [S.R.P.]
was the first close-to-shore bather bitten by a barracuda.”
Perez, 2010 WL 3927628, at *6. Zandy Hillis-Starr, the local
NPS official in charge of overseeing marine research in St.
Croix, testified in her deposition that she was unaware of any
prior barracuda attack on the Buck Island shoreline. The only
barracuda attack of which the NPS was aware was an attack
that occurred in deeper water and involved a boat captain
dumping fish oil into the water while dangling his feet over
the edge of a boat.
S.R.P. argues, however, that the District Court ignored
substantial evidence indicating that the NPS knew that
barracudas posed a serious risk to shallow-water swimmers.
First, S.R.P. notes that the Secretary of the Interior’s decision
to prohibit fishing in the waters surrounding Buck Island was
expected to increase the barracuda population in the area, thus
making an attack more likely. Second, he asserts that the
Buck Island brochure’s and beach signage’s advisory to
snorkelers to treat barracudas “with caution” indicates that
NPS officials were aware that barracudas were potentially
dangerous to humans. Third, he finds fault with the NPS’s
decision, after the attack on the boat captain, to warn
concessionaires not to feed the fish or put leftover food in the
water, but not to issue a similar warning to beachgoers.
Finally, S.R.P. claims that NPS officials were aware that
splashing in the “shallows” was a risk factor which increases
the likelihood of a barracuda attack.
S.R.P.’s arguments are unpersuasive. Based on the
evidence before the District Court, its finding that NPS
officials were unaware of the specific risk of a shoreline
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barracuda attack was not clearly erroneous. First, the fact that
a boat captain in deeper water was attacked years earlier after
pouring fish oil into the water does not suggest that an
individual would be attacked while sitting on the beach with
his feet in the water without any similar substance around
him. In fact, when the boat captain was attacked, there were
several snorkelers in the area, none of whom were bitten.
Thus, the presence of fish oil around the boat captain’s feet
seems to have been a significant factor in the attack. Second,
as to S.R.P.’s argument that the fishing ban should have put
officials on notice that a barracuda attack was more likely, the
record indicates that local NPS officials actually disagreed as
to whether the fishing ban would result in an increase in the
barracuda population. However, even if the ban did lead to
such an increase, because barracudas were not thought to be
aggressive toward swimmers, the NPS would have had no
reason to anticipate an increased likelihood of attack. Third,
although the Buck Island brochure advised snorkelers to treat
barracudas “with caution,” the same brochure stated that
barracudas are not generally aggressive toward humans.
Finally, S.R.P.’s claim that the NPS was aware that splashing
in the shallows could lead to a barracuda attack is somewhat
misleading. Although Hillis-Starr testified in her deposition
that “splashing in the shallows” was a recognized risk factor
for barracuda attacks, she made this statement while
discussing the attack on the boat captain. She did not indicate
that such behavior could lead to a barracuda attack on the
shoreline. In fact, she specifically stated that it was the
combination of pouring fish oil into the water and splashing
that led to the attack. Hillis-Starr hypothesized that the
barracuda likely mistook the boat captain’s feet for food.
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The key question under Gotha and Cestonaro is not
whether the Government was aware of danger in the most
general sense, but whether it was on notice of a specific
hazard. With no shoreline barracuda attacks in the twentytwo years preceding the attack on S.R.P., the District Court
did not err in finding that NPS officials had no knowledge
that such an attack was likely.
Assuming, arguendo, that the NPS was aware of the
risk, a plaintiff proceeding under the FTCA can only invoke
Gotha and Cestonaro where responding to the known hazard
would only require the Government to take garden-variety
action, such as putting up a rail or installing additional
lighting, which does not implicate any overarching policy
concerns. As we explained above, the NPS’s determination
regarding the content of warning signs on Buck Island
involved significant policy considerations. Thus, under
Gotha and Cestonaro, neither condition for finding the
challenged conduct outside the scope of the discretionary
function exception is present in this case.
C.
Burden of Proof and Standards for Rule
12(b)(1) Motion
Although our review of the District Court’s legal
conclusions is plenary, Merando, 517 F.3d at 163-64, because
our analysis – especially under Gotha and Cestonaro – relies
heavily on the District Court’s factual findings, which we
review only for clear error, CNA, 535 F.3d at 139, we now
address S.R.P.’s arguments that, in reaching those findings,
the District Court improperly shifted the burden of proving
the applicability of the discretionary function exception and
30

failed to apply a relaxed standard that we have held is
required when assessing factual challenges to jurisdiction
under Rule 12(b)(1).
1.
S.R.P. argues that the District Court improperly
required him to prove that the discretionary function did not
apply, rather than requiring the Government to prove that it
did apply. See Merando, 517 F.3d at 164 (stating that the
Government bears the burden of proving the applicability of
the discretionary function exception). We disagree. The
District Court correctly explained that the burden was on the
Government, Perez, 2010 WL 3927628, at *4, and held the
Government to its burden. Cf. Gould Elecs., Inc. v. United
States, 220 F.3d 169, 179 n.8 (3d Cir. 2000) (explaining that
failure to identify the governing standard suggests that the
district court may not have applied that standard).
Pointing to the District Court’s statement that
“[p]laintiff has presented little evidence that the NPS had
identified barracuda[s] as posing a serious risk to shallow
water bathers[,]” Perez, 2010 WL 3927628, at *6, S.R.P.
contends that rather than requiring the Government to
establish each prong of the discretionary function exception,
the District Court assessed the sufficiency of his evidence and
improperly rejected his claim that the NPS was aware of a
specific risk of shoreline barracuda attacks. According to
S.R.P., the District Court should have first determined that the
Government was mandated to act in the face of a known
hazard and then required the Government to establish that it
did not know of the hazard. S.R.P.’s argument glosses over a
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critical detail.
Before proceeding to the two-prong
discretionary function analysis, the District Court was
required to identify the conduct at issue, and in conducting
this threshold inquiry, it properly looked at all of the evidence
in the case. The way in which the District Court proceeded
was entirely consistent with our approach in Merando. See
517 F.3d at 162-69. In that case, the plaintiff argued that the
Government had negligently pruned a tree, and then failed to
find and remove the hazardous tree, causing it to fall on his
wife and daughter, tragically killing them. Id. at 162. We
found that the plaintiff’s allegation was unsupportable
because he had “not shown that the Government was in any
way involved in the [pruning] of the tree.” Id. at 167. We
thus “eliminate[d]” the plaintiff’s claim that the Government
negligently pruned the tree and confined our analysis to the
plaintiff’s challenge to the Government’s alleged failure to
find and remove the tree. Id. at 168. Similarly, the District
Court here was required to distinguish between S.R.P.’s claim
that the NPS was aware of a specific danger and failed to
warn, and his claim that the NPS failed to identify the danger
and warn accordingly. As in Merando, this distinction was
relevant because the nature of the conduct at issue dictates the
policy considerations that are implicated.
S.R.P. maintains that because the burden of proof was
on the Government, he was entitled to all reasonable
inferences that could be drawn from the evidence. This
argument, however, conflates the placement of the burden of
proof with the standard of review. The fact that the burden of
proof is on the Government does not mean that a district court
is required to apply a summary judgment standard and draw
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all inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Cf. Bouriez v.
Carnegie Mellon Univ., 585 F.3d 765, 770 (3d Cir. 2009)
(setting forth summary judgment standard under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 56). In fact, we have explicitly rejected
such an approach to evaluating factual challenges to
jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).
See Turicentro, 303 F.3d at 300 n.4. The district court is the
ultimate finder of fact on the jurisdictional question and is
thus entitled to draw inferences in favor of the defendant if it
determines that the evidence warrants such inferences. See
Merando, 517 F.3d at 167-68 (explaining that the evidence
did not allow us to draw the inference, favorable to the
plaintiff, that the NPS was involved in pruning the tree). As
we explained above, the evidence in this case did not warrant
a finding that the NPS had identified barracudas as posing a
danger to shoreline bathers.
2.
S.R.P. also argues that the District Court applied the
incorrect standard in evaluating the Government’s motion to
dismiss. Specifically, he contends that the District Court was
required, but failed, to apply a relaxed standard. We disagree;
the standard S.R.P. alleges was erroneously applied is not
applicable where, as here, the Government bears the burden
of proof.
When a district court considers a factual challenge to
subject matter jurisdiction, the court “accords the plaintiff’s
allegations no presumption of truth.” Turicentro, 303 F.3d at
300 n.4 (citations omitted). “[T]he plaintiff must either prove
the truth of the [necessary jurisdictional facts] or stand by
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while the court evaluates those allegations in the same way a
jury would evaluate [those facts] as part of [the] plaintiff’s
case on the merits.” Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891. “In a
factual attack, the court must weigh the evidence relating to
jurisdiction, with discretion to allow affidavits, documents,
and even limited evidentiary hearings.” Turicentro, 303 F.3d
at 300 n.4 (citations omitted).
As we have previously observed, in a factual attack
under the FTCA, “the split between jurisdiction and the
merits is not always clear.” CNA, 535 F.3d at 141. There
will frequently be overlapping issues of proof, causing the
jurisdictional challenge to be “intertwined with the merits.”
Id. at 143. This case presents precisely such a situation
because many of the same facts that are relevant to the
question of whether the discretionary function exception
applies are also relevant to the merits question of whether the
NPS was negligent in developing warning signs for Buck
Island. Recognizing that Rule 12(b)(1) does not provide
plaintiffs the procedural safeguards of Rule 12(b)(6), such as
assuming the truth of the plaintiff’s allegations, we have
articulated a relaxed standard of proof for the jurisdictional
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question where jurisdiction is intertwined with the merits. 7
See Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891. In such a case, a district
court may determine whether jurisdiction exists without
reaching the merits “so long as the court ‘demands less in the
way of jurisdictional proof than would be appropriate at a
trial stage.’” Gould Electronics, 220 F.3d at 178 (quoting
Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891). “By requiring less of a factual
showing than would be required to succeed at trial, [we]
ensure that [district courts] do not prematurely grant Rule
12(b)(1) motions to dismiss claims in which jurisdiction is
intertwined with the merits and could be established, along
with the merits, given the benefit of discovery.” See CNA,
535 F.3d at 145.
7

We note that several of our sister circuits disagree
with our approach, and require district courts to treat Rule
12(b)(1) motions to dismiss where jurisdiction is intertwined
with the merits as challenges on the merits. See Lawrence v.
Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1530 (11th Cir. 1990) (explaining
that, in such a situation, a district court is constrained by the
limitations of summary judgment practice); Williamson v.
Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 415 (5th Cir. 1981) (“Where the
defendant’s challenge to the court’s jurisdiction is also a
challenge to the existence of a federal cause of action, the
proper course of action for the district court . . . is to find that
jurisdiction exists and deal with the objection as a direct
attack on the merits of the plaintiff’s case.”). S.R.P.’s
reliance on these cases, however, is misplaced because we
take a different approach to cases where the jurisdictional
question is intertwined with the merits.
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S.R.P. argues that in concluding that the Government
had not identified barracudas as posing a risk to shallow
water bathers, the District Court failed to apply this relaxed
standard. 8 We have never directly addressed the role of this
standard where, as here, the burden of proving the relevant
jurisdictional facts is on the defendant. However, there is
clearly a logical tension between the two rules. Because the
plaintiff does not have to prove any facts related to the
applicability of the discretionary function exception, there is
nothing, at least in terms of facts that the plaintiff is required
to prove, to which to apply a relaxed standard of proof. And
applying that standard to the defendant, and thus allowing the
defendant to defeat jurisdiction more easily, would be
inconsistent with the policy underlying our creation of the
relaxed standard in the first place. See CNA, 535 F.3d at 145.
Accordingly, because the Government bears the burden of
proving the discretionary function exception, the “less in the
way of jurisdictional proof” standard does not apply.
Although we have applied that standard to other cases
brought under the FTCA, those cases are distinguishable
because they involved threshold requirements under 28
U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1), for which the plaintiff bears the burden
8

It is worth noting that although we hold that the “less
in the way of jurisdictional proof” standard does not apply
here because the Government bears the burden of proof, the
District Court specifically identified the relaxed standard and
purported to apply it. Thus, assuming, arguendo, that the
relaxed standard did apply, S.R.P.’s position would be
difficult to sustain.
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of proof. For example, in CNA v. United States, we applied
the relaxed standard to the question of whether a federal
employee was acting within the scope of his employment, as
required under § 1346(b)(1). 535 F.3d at 145-46. Similarly,
in Gould Electronics v. United States, we applied the relaxed
standard to the question of which state’s substantive law
controlled the underlying tort action. 9 220 F.3d at 178. Here,
in contrast to CNA and Gould, the Government bears the
burden of proving the necessary jurisdictional facts.
Accordingly, because the relaxed standard of proof did not
apply to the question before the District Court, S.R.P.’s
contention that the District Court failed to apply that standard
is inapposite.

9

In Gould Electronics v. United States, 220 F.3d 169,
178 (3d Cir. 2000), we stated that “we s[aw] no principled
reason to distinguish between a jurisdictional determination
based on the discretionary function exception and one based
on a conflict of laws analysis.” We do not see this language
as a barrier to our conclusion today. In Gould, we were
referring to the fact that there was no reason to treat a conflict
of law inquiry under the FTCA as non-jurisdictional where
other issues under the FTCA, including the applicability of
the discretionary function exception, are jurisdictional in
nature. Nowhere did we state that the “less in the way of
jurisdictional proof” standard applies to discretionary
function exception cases.
37

IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of
the District Court granting the Government’s motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
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SRP v. UNITED STATES
No. 10-4011

ROTH, Circuit Judge, Concurring:
I join the majority in affirming the District Court’s
dismissal of the claims in this case. I write separately,
however, because of my concern that the majority’s opinion
will eviscerate the discretionary function exception by
inserting an improper element into the analysis of whether
sovereign immunity has been waived under the FTCA. In my
view, (1) the NPS’s knowledge of the risk of barracuda
attacks and (2) our determination of whether the remedial
steps necessary to warn of that risk are “garden-variety” are
both irrelevant to the question of whether the discretionary
function exception protects the NPS from claims based on the
content, configuration, location or number of warning signs
displayed at Buck Island Reef National Monument. If the
discretionary function exception applies in a situation in
which consideration of public policy governs a choice of
action by a government agency, the “garden-variety” of the
remedy should not remove the shield of sovereign immunity.
I fear that the holding of the majority would do just that.
I agree with a great deal of what the majority has
stated. First, the discretionary function exception shields the
government only from those claims which challenge actions
that (1) “involve an element of judgment or choice” and that
(2) are “based on consideration of public policy.” United
States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322, 323 (1991). I also
agree that whether an action involves an element of judgment

or choice depends entirely on whether “a federal statute,
regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of action
. . ..” Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988). If
an action is specifically prescribed, there is no discretion as to
how to perform it. Finally, I agree that, if there is no precise
statutory, regulatory, or policy prescription for a course of
action, the determination whether an action is based on public
policy considerations focuses on the “nature of the action[]
taken” and whether it is “susceptible to policy analysis.
Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 315.
In this case, involving the National Park Service, an
examination of the applicable statutes, regulations and
policies reveals no specific prescription for how the NPS
should configure warning signs. To the contrary, NPS
policies direct that the NPS must exercise discretion in
deciding why, where, how and when to put up such signs.
The NPS Management Policies and the NPS Sign Manual
vest the NPS with the discretion to strike a balance between
economics, aesthetics and risk in determining the appropriate
response to hazards in the national parks. This discretion to
decide if and how risks will be warned of includes:
1. The consideration of what
measures will have the least
impact on park resources and
values.
2001 Management
Policies, ¶ 8.2.5.1.
2. The determination of whether
to install warning signs. Id.
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3. The allocation to the individual
park manager of the decision that
a sign is necessary or appropriate
for any given location. Sign
Manual, ¶ 1-1.
4. The limitation of signs to the
minimum number, size and
wording required to service their
intended
function.
2001
Management Policies, ¶ 9.3.1.1.
Clearly, as provided for in NPS policies, signage in the
National Parks is based on judgment and choice. The
selection and location of signage is, therefore, protected by
the discretionary function exception. As stated by the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, “the [NPS] policy manuals’ broad
mandate to warn the public of and protect it from special
hazards involves the exercise of discretion in identifying such
hazards, in determining the precise manner in which to warn
it of those hazards.” Blackburn v. United States, 100 F.3d
1426, 1431 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
In light of this discretion, the extent of the NPS’s
knowledge of a safety hazard is not relevant to the
consideration of whether the discretionary function exception
bars a suit challenging the NPS’s response to that hazard.
The NPS explicitly has the discretion to set up a system to
identify threats and to determine the proper warning, if any,
that should be given to the public of an identified threat. The
discretion to warn of a risk encompasses the discretion not to
warn. Indeed, the discretion to decide how to define risks
protects against the possibility of not uncovering a risk. For
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instance, in Merando v. United States, 517 F.3d 160 (3d Cir.
2008), where we found the discretionary function exception
protected the NPS in the system it chose to determine what
trees in the park might pose a danger to visitors, we
concluded that it made “no legal distinction” whether the NPS
was actually aware of the particular hazardous tree which fell.
In either case, sovereign immunity was not waived. Id. at
174.
Furthermore, even if the NPS were to be negligent in
its evaluation of the risks that should be warned of, because
the decision to warn is an exercise of discretion, the
discretionary function exception applies whether or not the
discretion has been appropriately exercised. The sovereign
immunity waiver of the FTCA specifically states that the
exception applies “whether or not the discretion involved be
abused.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (emphasis added).
Under the majority’s theory of this case, however, if
the government has knowledge of a safety hazard, then its
response to that hazard is protected by the discretionary
function exception only if addressing the hazard does not
require “garden-variety action.” The majority concluded that
the decision whether and how to further warn of barracuda
attacks at Buck Island could potentially be based on a
weighing of “the potential benefits of additional warnings
against the costs of such warnings, including the risk of
numbing Buck Island visitors to all warnings. Such a
determination is directly related to the NPS’s mission of
preserving national parks while ensuring public safety and is
thus firmly grounded in the policy of the regulatory regime.”
Ante ___ [typescript at 16].

4

The majority goes on, however, to limit this holding by
stating that “where the Government is aware of a specific risk
and responding to that risk would only require the
Government to take garden-variety remedial steps, the
discretionary function exception does not apply.” Ante ___.
[typescript at 19] (emphasis added).
It is this “garden-variety” language which has
prompted my concurrence. If the determination of the hazard
is protected by the discretionary function exception but the
risk of liability depends on whether the remedial steps to
correct or warn of this risk are “garden-variety,” or not,
haven’t we eviscerated the exception? Haven’t we protected
policy choices which require expensive, extensive, or
complicated remedies, but left the NPS open to liability if the
remedy is simple or inexpensive? Indeed, how do you
differentiate a “garden-variety” warning sign from a sign that
is not “garden-variety?”
This “garden-variety” language comes from our
opinions in Gotha v. United States, 115 F.3d 176 (3d Cir.
1997) and Cestonaro v. United States, 211 F.3d 749 (3d Cir.
2000). The majority claims that this “garden-variety”
analysis is necessary because of our holding in these two
cases. I do not interpret anything in either of those opinions
to establish such a qualification to the discretionary function
exception. Gotha involved the question of lightning and a
railing on a steep pathway in a U.S. Navy Base. We held that
the discretionary function exception did not apply because the
case was “not about a national security concern, but rather a
mundane, administrative, garden-variety, housekeeping
problem that [was] about as far removed from the policies
applicable to the Navy’s mission as . . . possible.” Gotha, 115

5

F.3d at 181 (emphasis added). There was no showing of any
U.S. Navy policy directives concerned with this issue. Here,
on the contrary, we do have NPS policy directives on point.
In Cestonaro, we evaluated whether the discretionary
function exception barred claims challenging the NPS’s
response to safety risks in an area on the edge of an NPS park
that was unofficially used as a parking lot for other places of
business. Plaintiff and his decedent had parked there to go to
a restaurant, not to visit the park. We stated that “[t]he
National Park Service’s knowledge, or lack thereof, of the
dangers in the Hospital Street lot relate more directly to the
underlying negligence claims than to whether the challenged
actions . . . were protected by the discretionary function
exception.” 211 F.3d at 751 n.1. I can only presume that in
coming to this conclusion, we did not equate risks of crime in
an unofficial parking area with the discretion necessary for
the NPS to determine what hazards within the parks should
warned of, where the warning should be placed, and how the
warning should be stated – discretionary matters spelled out
in NPS policy.
Therefore, for the reasons stated above, I would hold
that the NPS’s knowledge of a safety hazard is irrelevant to
the issue of whether the discretionary function exception bars
claims challenging NPS’s response to that hazard. I would
also hold that whether the measure taken to warn of that
hazard can be described as a “garden-variety” measure is
irrelevant. In my view, the applicability of the discretionary
function exception is contingent only upon (1) whether a
federal statute, regulation, or policy prescribes a specific
response and (2) if not, whether the choice of the response is
affected by social, economic, or political considerations. The
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nature of the proposed remedy -- “garden-variety” or
otherwise – does not matter. Because I agree that no statute,
regulation, or policy explicitly requires the NPS to respond to
the risk of barracuda attacks in a specific way and that the
policies of the NPS require discretion in identifying and
warning of hazards, I would apply the discretionary function
exception here to bar waiver of sovereign immunity – without
the “garden-variety” condition imposed by the majority.
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